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Constitutional Ideology, Language Rights and 
Political Disunity In Canada
WILLIAM C. CONKLIN*
This study argues that an important source of political disunity in 
Canada has been the constitutional ideology adopted by common law 
lawyers during this century. This ideology has ignored the importance 
of constitutional obligations to protect the French language 
undertaken prior to Confederation. It has prevented the lawyer and 
judge from taking account of the transformation of pclillcal power in 
Canada during this century. The ideology has also precluded the very 
possibility of the existence of fundamental rights, let alone language 
rights, without which minorities can have little confidence in the 
future.
When the student at law is asked to examine the constitutionality of 
any particular statute, he is trained to go immediately to sections 91 and 
92 o f the British North America Act, 1867, to ascertain whether the 
particular statute relates to a subject-matter within a class of subjects in 
section 91 or section 92. If related to section 91 then the statute is within 
federal jurisdiction. If section 92, then it falls within provincial 
jurisdiction.
The question of the extent to which our Constitution protects 
language rights in Canada has been no exception to this form of 
examination. Serious constitutional scholars such as Albert Abel,1 
Herbert Marx2 and Peter Hogg3 have examined language rights by 
reference to sections 91, 92 and 133 of the B.N.A. Act as well as section 
23 of the Manitoba Act. Section 133 expressly protects the use o f French 
and English in the proceedings of the federal courts, the Federal 
Parliament and the Quebec Legislature. Section 23 of the Manitoba Act,
•M.Sc., 1968, LL.B., 1971 (Toronto), LL.M., 1977 (Columbia). Associate Professor, Faculty o f Law, 
University o f Windsor. Copyright, William E. Conklin. An earlier version o f this paper was delivered 
to the Fifth Annual Law and Development Symposium at the Faculty of Law, University o f Windsor 
on March 24, 1978. The Proceedings are to be published in Law, Language and Development, edited 
by Lakshman Marasinghe and William E. Conklin, Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lakehouse Publishers, 1979.
‘Albert Abel, Opinion to Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights 
in Quebec, Report, Book II (Québec: Government o f Quebec, 1972).
’Herbert Marx, Language Rights in the Canadian Constitution, (1967) 2 Revue Juridique Thémis 239, at 
242.
’Peter Hogg, Constitutional Power Over Language, in Law Society o f Upper Canada, Special Lectures 1978. 
However, see Hogg's adoption of custom as a source o f Canadian constitutional law tnfra, footnote 4,
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which is similar to section 133, was adopted by a United Kingdom 
amendm ent to the B.N.A. Act in 1871. The Report of the Gendron 
Commission of the Quebec Government (1972) and the Reports of the 
Federal Government’s Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission also 
analyzed the problem in the light of sections 91, 92 and 133.
In this paper I shall argue that political disunity in Canada is the 
result o f much more than mere economic factors such as unemploy­
ment, and much more than the maldistribution of economic wealth 
between English-speaking and French-speaking Québécois. I shall 
suggest that an important source of political disunity in Canada lies in 
the deeply engrained normative political values or assumptions with 
which the political elite (which, for reasons explained below, includes 
judges) perceive the world. I shall substantiate this suggestion by 
reference to the m anner in which common law lawyers of English- 
speaking Canada perceive the nature of the Canadian Constitution and I 
shall demonstrate how this perception is connected to the problem of 
language rights and political disunity in Canada.
One avenue o f attempting to establish this thesis might be to study 
empirically the values of English-speaking and French-speaking jurists 
through sophisticated interviewing techniques. One would then be 
required to show a direct connection between those values, on the one 
hand, and legal arguments and judicial decisions on the other. One 
would then be obliged to show why those decisions and arguments 
worked to cause political disunity in Canada. I shall, however, employ a 
different tactic. I shall argue that traditional constitutional analysis of 
language rights in Canada has focused primarily upon the B.N.A. Act, 
1867 and, in particular, sections 91, 92 and 133 of the said Act. This 
analysis, I shall argue, leads to a restricted appreciation o f the nature of 
the Canadian Constitution in that it has ignored the normative or 
“ought” presuppositions and questions as a legitimate inquiry of 
constitutional analysis. Evidence of such presuppositions can be found in 
what has traditionally been called “customary constitutional law.”4 I shall 
suggest that customary constitutional law prior to Confederation 
demonstrated that political authorities in Canada were obligated to 
ensure that Francophones and Anglophones be able to understand and 
express themselves in their own language when their own rights and 
privileges were at issue. The normative beliefs, as evidenced in 
institutional history prior to Confederation, imposed serious constitu­
tional obligations which could only have been subsequently met with
great difficulty, given the twentieth century constitutional ideology in nglish-speaking Canada.
4M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 5th ed., 1970). See also the 
most recent text on Canadian Constitutional Law: P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1973) at 1-11, as well as J. E. C. Munroe, The Constitution of Canada (Cambridge U. Press, 
1889) at 40-43.
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A. The Nature o f the Constitution
The idea that there is more to our Constitution than the B.N.A. Act 
is not a new one. MacGregor Dawson in his classic political science text 
The Government of Canada, emphasized that “It is a convenient but far 
from accurate statement to say that Canada has a written constitution, 
for the written British North America Act and its amendments tend to 
overshadow those other constitutional principles and understandings whose 
nature and significance are not so clearly and obviously indicated.”5 
[Emphasis added] Dawson provided evidence of the importance of the 
non-B.N.A. Act portion of the Constitution.6 The non-B.N.A. Act part, 
he wrote:
. . . embraces principles of the common law as defined by the courts; some 
British and Canadian acts of Parliament and orders-in-council; judicial inter­
pretations of the written constitution and other laws; the rules and privileges of 
Parliament; and many other habitual and informal methods o f 
government . . .  All these, many of them (despite the term unwritten) 
committed to writing, others in much more intangible and elusive form; exert 
a powerful influence on constitutional practice.7
One of the leading constitutional casebooks used in English-speaking 
Canadian law schools, edited by Professors J. D. Whyte and W. R. 
Lederman, adopts Chief Justice McRuer’s assertion that “it is a serious 
error to think that the British North America Act either gathers them all 
[that is, the legal forms of the Constitution] into one document or was 
ever intended to do so.”8 McRuer went on to suggest that constitutional 
essentials are found:
. . .  in the B.N.A. Act, but many more are outside it in federal statutes, provincial 
statutes, judicial interpretations of the B.N.A. Act, historically received 
English judge-m ade public law, conventions of cabinet government, rules of 
parliamentary procedure and other sources.9
Consistent with this perspective, one of the three parts of the above 
casebook attempts to explore how the legislative powers under the
B.N.A. Act have been restricted by constitutional principles relating to 
fundamental rights.
A second constitutional casebook,10 also used in English-speaking 
Canadian law schools, edited by Professor N. Lyon and R. Atkey, begins 
its chapter on “What is the Canadian Constitution?” with this response:
5/W „ at 58.
*Ibid., at c.4.
'Ibid., at 60.
•Whyte and Lederman, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1975) at 1-7.
*Ibtd., at 1-7.
“ Lyon and Atkey, Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modem Perspective (Toronto: Univ. o f Toronto Press, 
1970).
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The constitution o f a people is found in the attitudes and customs of its 
members and in the working practices o f its institutions. . . .  In a written 
constitution a people may try to articulate shared goals, that is, what they 
want to become, at least in their better moments. But the actual constitution 
of a people can be observed only in the actual patterns o f behaviour o f its j
m em bers. . .  to talk about a written document as ‘the constitution’ is to 
mistake a device for its objective . . .  .n
These constitutional scholars have directed their attention to 
non-B.N.A. Act sources o f constitutional law for a reason. The reason, 
though not explicitly stated, relates to the nature of constitutional 
obligation. Wherever there exists a right, Hohfeld argued, there is a 
duty.12 If the Constitution requires the performance of certain duties, 
why does it do so? Why are political leaders bound to perform  the 
constitutional duties? These questions must be faced before we can begin 
to analyse whether language rights are protected in our Constitution 
and, if so, to what extent they are protected.
The scholarly works on language rights in Canada indicate that if a 
bill restricts communications between citizen and bureaucracy to one or 
two particular languages, the constitutional issue is whether the allegedly 
offensive subject-matter in the bill falls within the heads of power in 
section 91 or, alternatively, section 92 of the B.N.A. Act.13 Once it is 
established that the bill falls under the correct head, then, by virtue of 
the principle of legislative supremacy, the bill is considered constitu­
tional. But, why must we suppose that the Constitution requires the 
legislature to be supreme? Why is the power and jurisdiction of the 
legislature, to use the words of Sir William Blackstone, “so transcendent 
and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons, 
within any bounds”?14 Why is this the place “where absolute despotic 
power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, [be] entrusted 
by the constitution . . .”?15 Why is there an absence of legal restraint
11Ibid., at 70.
“ Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied m Judicial Reasoning (ed. by W. W. Cook, 
New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1964).
“ See generally, infra, at footnotes 80 to 83.
14As reprinted in Ekrlich's Blackstone ed. J. W. Ehrlich (New York: Capricorn, 1959) at 55.
'*lbid., continued:
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confining, enlarging, 
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding o f laws, concerning matters 
o f all possible denominations, ecclesiastical and temporal, civil, military, maritime or 
criminal; this being the place where absolute despotic power, which must in all 
governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution o f these kingdoms.
* * *
It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have 
not scrupled to call its power the omnipotence o f parliament. T rue it is that what the 
parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo . . . .
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upon the power of the legislature?16 Why may the legislature not bind 
itself into the future?17
The traditional response in Canada would be, o f course, that the 
B.N.A. Act so declares. But in what section(s) of the B.N.A. Act does 
one find the above propositions? Do sections 91 and 92 enact that the 
federal Parliament and provincial Legislatures may legislate upon all 
subject-matters? What section of the B.N.A. Act provides that Canadian 
courts may pass judgm ent only upon jurisdictional disputes involving 
section 91 and 92? Section 17 enacts that “there shall be One Parliament 
for Canada”.18 O ther provisions o f the Act require a time limit for the 
calling and dissolution o f Parliament.19 These provisions, however, in no 
way require that the Legislatures are supreme in any of the senses 
elaborated by leading jurists. Nor do the provisions relating to the 
Judicature20 proscribe judges from passing judgm ent upon enactments 
of the Legislatures nor do the Judicature provisions direct the Courts to 
accept as finally authoritative any expression of the Legislature’s will. 
One might finally resort to the preamble of the B.N.A. Act, according to 
which Canada is to have a Constitution “similar in principle to that of 
the United Kingdoms”. By virtue of the preamble, it might be 
submitted, Canada had adopted the principle of legislative supremacy in 
the 1867 United Kingdom Constitution.21 Unfortunately, interpretation 
principles22 in the United Kingdom require that one may use a 
preamble only to resolve an ambiguity or incongruity within the existing 
enacting portion of a statute? There is no such ambiguity or incongruity 
within the enacting portion of the B.N.A. Act.
‘*J. B. Mitchell, in an important essay on legislative supremacy, argues that the supremacy of the 
legislature means “the absence o f any legal restraint upon the legislative power o f the United Kingdom 
Parliament”. On the one hand Parliament may legislate upon any subject matter. On the other, once 
Parliament has legislated, no court o r other person can pass judgm ent upon the validity of the 
legislation. J. B. Mitchell, Sovereignty of Parliament — Yet Again, ( 1963) 79 L.Q.R. 1% at 197.
,TO ne of the central propositions followed by the courts is that the Legislature may not bind itself into 
the future. See generally Duke of Argyle v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1914] L.T. 893 (K.B. Div.); 
Vauxhaull Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corporation, [1932] 1 K.B. 733 at 743 and 745; Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. 
Minister o f Health, [1934] 1 K.B. 590 per Scrutton, L.J. at 595 and per Maugham, L.J. at 597; British Coal 
Corp. v. The King, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 401, [1935] 2 W.W.R. 564, 64 C.C.C. 145; Blackburn v. A-G, [1971] 1 
All E.R. 1380 (C.A.)
"See also, for example, sections 69 and 71.
‘•Sections 20, 91(1) and 85.
’•Sections 96 to 101.
*‘The courts o f 1867 had not yet established two of the three present day pillars o f legislative 
supremacy. The one, the principle o f the conclusiveness o f statutes, was not adopted as the "ratio” o f a 
House of Lords decision until 1974. Bntuh Railways Bd  v. Purkin [1972] 2 W.L.R. 208 (H.L.) reversing, 
[1972] 3 All E.R. 923, [1973] 1 Q.B. 219, [1972], 3 W.L.R. 824 (C.A.). T he other, the principle that 
Parliament could not bind itself into the future, was not established until the early twentieth century. 
See Duke of Argyle v. Commissioners o f Inland Revenue, [1914] L.T. 893 (K.B. Div.); Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. 
Liverpool Corp., [1932] 1 K.B. 733 at 743 and 745; Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minuter of Health, [1934] 1 
K.B. 590 per Scrutton, L.J. at 595 and per Maugham, L.J. at 597; Bntuh Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] 3 
D.L.R. 401, [1935] 2 W.W.R. 564, 64 C.C.C. 145.
*M-G v. Prmce Augustus, [1957] A.C. 437.
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Let us assume that the B.N.A. Act did require that Parliament be 
supreme. The issue remains, why are the Canadian courts obligated to 
follow the B.N.A. Act? A student of law would answer that the B.N.A. 
Act was a duly enacted instrument of the United Kingdom Parliament. 
But why, in turn, should the Canadian courts follow the United 
Kingdom Parliament? Again, the student would have a reply. Canada 
was, at the time of the passing of the B.N.A. Act, 1867, subject to the 
United Kingdom Parliament and, in addition, the United Kingdom 
Parliament had duly enacted the B.N.A. Act according to the proper 
m anner and form requirements at the time.
This response leads us back to the original question. What gives 
the “m anner and form ” requirem ents their authority? One can 
examine the statutory, customary or common law basis of “m anner and 
form” requirements only so far until one returns to the question originally 
posed. If the courts will obey any legal rule which alters a “m anner and 
form” requirem ent itself, we must ask what institution can alter the 
“m anner and form ” requirement and why should the courts obey the 
new rule?
It would seem that Professor Wade is proceeding in the right 
direction when he responds that the courts obey statutes not because of 
any legal rule but because o f political history.23 That is, the source o f the 
constitutional obligation of the courts lies in the world of political norms, 
in the “sense of obligation” that the courts ought to respect certain 
political principles. Quoting approvingly from Salmond,24 H. W. R. 
Wade explained:
All rules of law have historical sources. As a matter of fact and history they 
have their origin somewhere, though we may not know what it is. But not all 
of them have legal sources. Were this so, it would be necessary for the law to 
proceed 'ad infinitum’ in tracing the descent of its principles. It is requisite 
that the law should postulate one or more first causes, whose operation is 
ultimate and whose authority is underived. . . . The rule 'hat a man may not 
ride a bicycle on the footpath may have its source in the by-laws of a 
municipal council; the rule that these by-laws have the force of law has its 
source in an Act of Parliament. But whence comes the rule that Acts of 
Parliament have the force o f law? This is legally ultimate; its source is 
historical only, not legal. . . .  It is the law because it is the law, and for no 
other reason that it is possible for the law itself to take notice of. No statute 
can confer this power upon Parliament, for this would be to assume and act 
on the very power that is to be conferred.
The principle of legislative supremacy has its authority, in other words, 
with the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688.
The implications of Wade’s important point are clear. The student’s 
reliance upon the British North America Acts is not the ultimate
,SH. W. R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty [1955] Cambridge L.J. 172.
u Salmond on Jurisprudence (10th ed.), edited by Glanville Williams at 155 as quoted by Wade, ibid., at 
187.
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response to the issue of why the legislature is supreme in Canada. For, 
the constitutional principle of legislative supremacy itself lies upon 
normative political values. Consequently, the constitutional lawyer can 
legitimately ask whether legislative supremacy as divided between the 
federal and provincial governments ought to provide the justificatory 
basis o f language rights in Canada. The very nature o f the Canadian 
Constitution, in other words, permits one to ask questions of history and 
normative questions of political philosophy as a legitimate inquiry into 
the nature and extent of constitutional obligations in Canada. The judge 
or lawyer who discards these issues as academic ones, on account of 
the constitutional principle of legislative supremacy, is adopting a value 
judgm ent in the world of political norms.25
If the above line of argum ent is correct then it would seem to follow 
that legislative supremacy is a mere conception, not a perception.26 It is 
a real constitutional principle because it is deeply believed in. The 
“legal’’ obligation thrust upon the courts that they ought not to restrain 
the legislative authority of the legislature is real because the parties (that 
is, lawyers, judges and legislators) operate as if that obligation were real.
What resource materials, then, should a constitutional lawyer 
examine when asked to assess the nature of language rights in Canada? 
Clearly, the B.N.A. Act is only one document to which the lawyer can 
attach weight with respect to the issue of what normative political values 
and principles underlie our society. We have just seen that the B.N.A. 
Act, 1867, is not declarative o f our constitutional rights and duties. 
The Act does not impose or posit our constitutional rights and duties. 
Rather, it is merely constitutive of them. It merely provides some insight 
as to the nature and scope of our constitutional rights and obligations in 
the past. O ther indicia which the constitutional lawyer may legitimately 
use to ascertain past constitutional rights and duties are statutes, 
regulations, judicial decisions, legislative resolutions, policies and 
practices o f bureaucrats, practices of the legislature, the tacit 
understandings between and amongst governmental officials, the 
acquiescence by one government in the face of the unilateral conduct of 
another, the failure of a government to follow or to render a judicial 
decision effective, pleadings of counsel, scholarly studies, Royal Com­
mission and task force reports, legislative committee reports and the 
like.
Because the basis of constitutional obligation lies in the world of 
political norms rather than legal rules which apply in some “all or 
nothing” fashion, these resource materials do not, of themselves, posit
“ The above argument is elaborated in further detail in William E. Conklin, In Defence of Fundamental 
Rights (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, 197-*), chap. 2, sect. 3(c).
“ Hamish Gray describes sovereignty as “a metaphysical conception” in The Sovereignty o f Parliament 
Today, (1953) 10 U. Toronto L.J. 54 at 54. See also, Middleton, K.W.B. Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 
(1952), 64 Juridical Review 35.
46 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
constitutional obligations. Rather, they provide “institutional support” 
for the existence or non-existence o f a “sense o f obligation” which past 
political authorities might have had toward any particular issue. Because 
of the normative basis of constitutional obligation, the constitutional 
lawyer may do more than just examine institutional history. He may 
legitimately ask whether the principles rooted in the institutional history 
ought to be followed as a question of political philosophy.27 For 
example, are the language rights principles which are embedded in 
Canadian institutional history contradictory, misdirected or otherwise 
inappropriate as an issue o f normative political philosophy, given the 
claim by jurists and legislators that our civil institutions are founded 
upon the existence of fundamental individual rights? The latter line of 
inquiry is unnecessary in the present context, given this paper’s limited 
objective of showing why the common law lawyer’s m anner o f perceiving 
the Constitution has served as an important source of political disunity 
in Canada.
B. The Constitutional Obligation with respect to Language in 
Pre-Confederation Canada
It is in this light that one can better understand the legal history of 
bilingualism in Quebec and Ontario to be more than just “legal 
history”. Rather, the legal history provides institutional support tor the 
existence o f wide constitutional duties thrust upon the Federal, Manitoba 
and Quebec governments to protect the Francophone and Anglophone 
minorities in the respective jurisdictions prior to Confederation. The 
duties emanated, to begin with, from a cluster of obligations undertaken 
by the United Kingdom government upon the cession of Quebec to the 
British.
According to the principles of constitutional law at the time of 
cession o f the French colonies in North America, if the United Kingdom 
acquired a colony by conquest or cession and if the colony at that time 
of conquest had laws of its own, the laws of the conquered or ceded 
colony remained in force unless and until the Crown altered those 
laws.28 This proposition, however, was subject to two important qualifications 
laid down by Lord Mansfield in Campbell v. Hall.29 In the first place, the 
articles of capitulation upon which the colony was surrendered and the
’’Some of the questions o f political philosophy which constitutional lawyers should face are examined in 
A Defence of Fundamental Rights, Supra, footnote 25, chap. 3 to 7.
Campbell v. Hall, 1. Comp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B., 1774); In re Cape Breton, 13 E.R. 489 (P.C., 
1846); Kielly v. Carson, 13 E.R. 225 (P.C., 1842).
i%Campbell v. Hall, ibid.
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treaty by which the colony was ceded were sacred and inviolable. Secondly, 
the King could not make any change in the laws of the conquered 
country “contrary to fundam ental principles” (by which Mansfield 
presumably meant the equitable principles o f natural justice).
There appears little dispute but that Quebec was acquired either by 
conquest or cession rather than by settlement.30 Lord Mansfield’s two 
important qualifications, therefore, must be considered. The Articles of 
Capitulation of Quebec31 and Montreal32 in 1760, and the Treaty of 
Paris, 1763,33 as a consequence, provide particularly weighty evidence of 
the content o f customary constitutional law during the late 18th century. 
Most noteworthy was the provision for the safeguarding of the Roman 
Catholic religion in Quebec. Article 6 of the Articles of the Capitulation 
of Quebec, 1759, guaranteed, for example, that:
T he exercise of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion shall be 
preserved; that safe-guards shall be given to the houses of the clergy, to the 
monasteries and the convents, especially to His Lordship the Bishop of 
Quebec, who, full of zeal for religion and of love for the people of his 
diocese, desires to remain constantly in it, to exercise freely, ana with the 
decency which has standing and the sacred mysteries of the Catholic, 
Apostolic, and Roman religion requires, his episcopal authority in the town of 
Quebec, whenever he shall think fit, until the possession of Canada has been 
decided by a treaty between his most Christian Majesty and his Britannic 
Majesty.
Libre exercise de la religion romaine, sauves gardes accordees a toutes 
personnes religieuses ainsi qu’a Mr. l’eveque qui pourra venir exercer 
librement et avec decence les fonctions de son état lorsqu'il le jugera apropos, 
jusqu’a ce que la possession du Canada ayt ete decidee entre sa Majeste B. et
S.M.T.C.
According to Houston, the draft Articles sent to Lieutenant de Ramzay 
from the Marquis de Vaudreuil had the following comment noted beside 
Article 6:
Prouver que c’est ‘interest de S.M.B. dans le cas ou le Canada luy resteroit,’ 
et qu’en Europe touttes les conquettes que font les divers souverains, il ne 
changent point l’exercise de religion qu’autant que ces conquettes leur 
restent.
Article 2 had guaranteed the preservation of “the privileges” o f the 
inhabitants. Article 11 provided that “the present capitulation shall be
**There is a dispute, however, as to whether acquisition was by conquest or by cession. See generally, 
Anger and Honsberger, Canadian Law of Real Property (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1959) c .i; 
Armour, A Treatise on the Law of Real Property (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1901) c.2.
"A s reprinted in W. Houston, Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Books for 
Libraries Press, 1891, 1970 reprint) at 27.
**As reprinted in ibid., at 33.
MAs reprinted ibid., at 61.
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executed according to its form and tenor, without being subject to 
nonexecution under pretext of reprisals or o f the non-execution of some 
previous capitulation.”
T he Articles of Capitulation of Montreal acknowledged British 
obligations toward the Francophone minority in even clearer language. 
Article 27 expressly guaranteed the freedom of the Francophones to 
establish their Roman Catholic religion. Article 27 provided that:
The free exercise of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion shall subsist 
entire, in such m anner that all classes and peoples of the towns and rural 
districts, places, and distant posts may continue to assemble in the churches, 
and to frequent the sacraments as heretofore, without being molested in any 
manner, directly or indirectly. These people shall be obliged by the English 
Government to pay to the priests, who shall have the oversight o f them, the 
tithes and all the dues they were accustomed to pay under the Government of 
his Most Christian Majesty.
Accordé pour le libre exercise de leur Religion. L’obligation de payer la 
dixme aux prêtes dépendra de la volonté du Roy.
Articles 28 to 35 went on to elaborate precise protections for the Roman 
Catholic clergy. Article 28, in particular, provided that “The Chapter, 
priests, cureo and missionaries shall continue with entire freedom of 
their parochial services and functions in the parishes of the towns and 
rural districts”. Article 42 then went on to provide that the British were 
obligated to respect Francophone laws and customs generally:
The French and Canadians shall continue to be governed according to the 
custom of Paris, and the laws and usages established for this country; and 
they shall not be subjected to any other imposts than those which were 
established under the French dominion.
One should note that the major source of French law at this point in 
time was custom and usage as opposed to the present-day sources of 
legislation or judicial decision. Article 42, therefore, embodied the 
obligation of the United Kingdom government to respect French law 
generally whether its source be custom as at the time of the cession or 
legislation as in later years. Finally, Article 50 provided that “The 
present capitulation shall be inviolably executed in all its articles, on both 
sides, and in good faith, notwithstanding any infraction and any other 
pretext with regard to preceding capitulation, and without resorting to 
reprisals”. [Emphasis added]
By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, the French government ceded her 
possessions over to the Crown of Great Britain “in the most ample 
m anner and form, without restriction and without any liberty to depart 
from the said cession and guaranty, under any pretense, or to disturb
Great Britain in the possessions......... ” Ori the other hand, the Treaty
did reflect a respect toward religious freedom. Article 4 provided:
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. . .  His Britannic Majesty on his side agrees to grant the liberty of the 
Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will consequently give the 
most precise and most effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic subjects 
may profess the worship o f their religion, according to the rites o f the Romish 
Church, as far as the laws o f Great Britain permit.
The latter clause differed from the position in the Articles of 
Capitulation o f Quebec and Montreal in that, although the Roman 
Catholic religion occupied a protected position in the Treaty, it was not 
acknowledged to be beyond restriction. The phrase “as far as the laws of 
Great Britain perm it” is not found in the Articles of Capitulation.
On the other hand, the institutional support for the protection of 
the Francophone culture was not consistently embedded in the early 
constitutional experience of Quebec. As with other British colonies,34 the 
authority of British administrators was set out in Royal Proclamations, 
Commissions and often secret Instructions. In the case of Quebec, the 
Treaty o f Paris, 1763, was followed up with the Royal Proclamation, 
1763,35 the Commission o f G overnor M urray, 1763,36 and the 
Instructions to Governor Murray dated 7 December 1763.37 The latter 
three instruments gave wide authority for Governor Murray to 
introduce English laws into the colony and to encourage assimilation of 
the Francophone or, as the British described them, the Canadian 
community. The Proclamation, in particular, granted authority to the 
Governor with the consent of a Council and Assembly “to make, 
constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public 
peace, welfare, and good government of our said colonies,. . .  as near as 
may be, agreeable to the laws of England”. Murray could, in addition, 
set up courts to hear “all causes as well criminal as civil according to law 
and equity, and, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of 
England. . . .” T he Crown made similar provisions in Governor M urray’s 
Commission. The Instructions to Murray called for the demise o f ‘the 
Canadian religion’. According to section 32:
You are not to admit of any Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the See of 
Rome, or any other foreign Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction whatsoever in the 
Province under your Government.
34See generally, loseph H. Smith, Administrative Control o f the Courts of the American Plantations, (1961), 61 
Col. L. Rev. 1210 ana The English Legal System: Carry Over to the Colonies (Univ. o f Calif. 1975).
3>The Royal Proclamation, 7 October, 1763 as reprinted in W. P. M. Kennedy Documents of the Canadian 
Constitution, 1759-1915 (Toronto: Oxford U. Press, 1918) at 18-21.
**Commission of Governor Murray, 21 November, 1763 as reprinted in Houston, supra, footnote 31, at 
74-78.
,TInstructions to Governor Murray, 7 December 1763 as reprinted in Kennedy, Supra, footnote 35, at
27-37.
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T he Instructions continued:
33. And to the end that the Church of England may be established both in 
Principles and Practice, and that the said Inhabitants may by Degrees be 
induced to embrace the Protestant Religion, and their Children be brought 
up in the Principles o f it; We do hereby declare it to be our Intention . . .  all 
possible Encouragement shall be given to the erecting o f Protestant 
Schools . . . .  by settling, appointing and alloting proper Quantities of Land 
for that Purpose; and also for a Glebe and Maintenance for a Protestant 
Minister and Protestant School Masters; and you are to consider and report 
to Us . . . by what other Means the Protestant Religion may be prom oted, 
established and encouraged in O ur Province under your Government.
Article 38 added that no person could teach without a licence from the 
Lord Bishop of London. It is difficult not to conclude that the intent of 
the 1763 Proclamation, Commission and Instructions was to assimilate 
the Canadian community into that of the British.
In Part A above, I argued that the nature of our Constitution is such 
that formal documents such as the Treaty of Paris or the 1763 
Proclamation are constitutive, rather than declarative, of constitutional 
rights and duties. As a consequence, one important criterion for the 
validity of a customary constitutional right or duty is whether it has been 
consistently acknowledged over a lengthy period of time.38 The 1763 Pro­
clamation, Commission and Instructions must, therefore, be read in the 
context of other instruments coming both before and after 1763. Secondly, 
one can only assess the constitutional significance of the 1763 instruments 
by examining the actual practice in communications between Canadian 
and British political officials. Once one understands the nature of the 
Constitution in this light, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 with its attendant 
Commission and Instructions is seen to be the aberration of an otherwise 
consistent British undertaking to respect and to protect the French 
religion, customs and laws — the central elements, in other words, of 
French culture at that time.
I have shown how the Articles of Capitulation of Quebec and 
Montreal in 1760 along with the Treaty of Paris, 1763, safeguarded the 
establishment and free exercise of Roman Catholicism, the “privileges” 
of the inhabitants and, in the case of the Treaty, “the custom of Paris 
and the laws and usages established for this country”. T he Royal 
Proclamation, Commission and Instructions of 1763 clearly contradicted 
these guarantees. But, as already noted, English constitutional principles 
held the Articles o f Capitulation and the Treaty to be “sacred and 
inviolable”. The Royal Proclamation, Commission and Instructions of 
1763 were thereby invalid to the extent that they contradicted the earlier 
undertakings by the British.
’'A nother important criterion is whether the political presuppositions underlying such a customary right 
or duty are consistent with claims by judges, legislators and lawyers, for example, that Canada is 
founded upon the existence o f fundamental rights. See generally, Conklin, supra, footnote 25.
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The invalidity o f the 1763 Royal Proclamation, Commission and 
Instructions as a source o f customary constitutional law is confirmed by 
the fact that, according to Bourinot39 and Kennedy,40 there remained 
great uncertainty between 1763 and 1774 as to the nature and extent of 
British obligations toward the Canadians. Furtherm ore, notwithstanding 
his Instructions, it is recorded that Governor Murray did not pursue the 
assimilationist policy.41 Although his Commission and Instructions 
directed that he should summon a legislative assembly, Murray did not 
do so for fear of placing political power in the hands of the English 
minority.42 By an Ordinance dated September 17th, 1764 Murray 
provided that all subjects were to be admitted to jury duty “without 
distinction” according to race.43 Also, “Canadian [his emphasis] 
Advocats, Procters, etc., may practise in this Court.” As Murray 
explained a month later, “Unless the Canadians are admitted on Jurys, 
and are allowed Judges and Lawyers who understand their Language his 
Majesty will lose the greatest part of this valuable people.”44 [Emphasis 
added] Finally, the September 17th Ordinance established an inferior 
Court o f Common Pleas which, in practice, heard lesser civil cases 
amongst French speaking Canadians.45 The court was essential, 
according to Murray, because:
. . .  not to admit of such a court, until they can be supposed to know something 
of our laws and methods of procuring justice in our courts, would be like 
sending a ship to sea without a compass: indeed it would be more cruel, the ship 
might escape . . .  but the poor Canadians could never shun the attempts of 
designing men and the voracity of hungry practitioners in the law. They must 
be undone during the first months of their ignorance: if any escaped, their 
affections must be alienated and disgusted with our government and laws.4* 
[Emphasis added]
By late 1764 official Crown policy emanating from London also 
deviated from the 1763 Proclamation, Commission and Instructions. 
The Crown officers instructed Murray not to use the Royal Proclamation 
so as to take away “from the native inhabitants the benefit of their own 
laws and customs in cases where titles to land and modes o f descent,
'•Sir J. G. Bourinot, A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada from the Earliest Period to 1901 
(Toronto: Copp, Clark, 1901) at 8-9.
4,W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937 (Toronto: Oxford U. Press, 2nd ed., 1938) at 
48 ff.
4,George F. G. Stanley, A Short History of the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969) at 27.
"T hough  elected, one could not sit in the Assembly, according to the Instructions (Article 29), unless he 
swore an anti-Catholic oath. In addition, only “freeholders" could stand for election (Article 11).
i3Ordinance Establishing Civil Courts, 1764 as reprinted in Kennedy, supra, footnote 35, at 37-40.
“ Letter from Governor Murray to the Lords o f T rade dated October 29th, 1764 as reprinted in 
Kennedy, supra, footnote 35, at 41.
4lSupra, footnote 40, at 38.
4,As quoted in Kennedy, ibid.
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alienation, and settlement are in question, nor to preclude them from 
that share in the administration o f judicature which both in reason and 
justice they are entitled to, in common with the rest o f our subjects.”47 
In 1766 the Crown’s legal officers criticized the judicial system as being 
“without the aid of the natives, not merely in new forms, but totally in an 
unknown tongue.” [Emphasis added] Indeed, the legal officers expressly 
renounced the attempt by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to abolish “all 
the usages and customs of Canada with the rough hand of a 
conqueror.”48 By 1774 the British Attorney-General could confidently 
state that the Royal Proclamation of 1763:
. . .  if it is to be considered according to that perverse construction of the letter 
o f it; if it is to be considered as creating an English constitution; if it is to be 
considered as importing English laws into a country already settled, and 
habitually governed by other laws, I take it to be an act o f the grossest and 
absurdest and cruelest tyranny, that a conquering nation ever practised over a 
conquered country. Look back, Sir, to every page of history, and I defy you 
to produce a single instance, in which a conqueror went to take away from a 
conquered province, by one rough stroke, the whole of their constitution, the 
whole o f their laws under which they lived . . . My notion is, that it is a change 
of sovereignty. You acquired a new country; you acquired a new people; but 
you do not state the right of conquest, as giving you a right to goods and 
chattels. That would be slavery and extreme misery . .  . you ought to change 
those laws only which relate to the French sovereignty, and in their place 
substitute laws which should relate to the new sovereign; but with respect to all 
other laws, all other customs and institutions whatever, which are indifferent to the 
state o f subjects and sovereign, humanity, justice and wisdom equally conspire to 
advise you to leave them to the people just as they were.. . . 49 [Emphasis added]
The preferred position o f the Canadian (that is, Francophone) 
culture in the Canadian Constitution is confirmed, most significantly, 
by the Quebec Act, 17 74.50 Interestingly, the preamble to Article IV 
acknowledged that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 along with the 
Commissions and Instructions to Governors Murray and Carleton “have 
been found upon experience to be inapplicable to the state and 
circumstances of the said Province.” Upon “the conquest”, the preamble 
continued, 65,000 inhabitants had professed Roman Catholicism. They 
had “for a long series of years” enjoyed “an established form of 
constitution and system of laws”. As a result, the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, all Commissions and Instructions to Governors were expressly 
“revoked, annulled and made void”. Article V of the Quebec Act 
guaranteed the free exercise of the Catholic religion. It was written that 
persons:
4TAs quoted in Kennedy, ibtd., at 42.
4'A s quoted in Mason Wade, The French-Canadtan Outlook (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1964) at 
17-18.
4*Debates in the British Parliament on the Quebec Act, 1774 as reprinted in Kennedy, supra, footnote 35, 
at 92.
4#Quebec Act, 1774 as reprinted in Houston, supra, footnote 31, at 90-96.
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. . .  professing the religion of the Church of Rome, o f and in the said Province of 
Quebec, may have, hold and enjoy the free exercise o f the religion o f the 
Church o f Rome, subject to the King's supremacy, declared and established by an 
Act made in the First year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. . . . [the Act of 
Settlement]. [Emphasis added]
Article XV followed this up by providing that “no Ordinance touching 
religion . . . shall be o f any force or effect, until the same shall have 
received His Majesty’s approbation”. By Article VIII, in ail matters of 
controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort was to be had to 
“the laws of Canada” (that is, the laws, customs and usages of the 
Francophone community). Until altered by Ordinance, the “laws and 
customs of Canada” (that is, of the Francophone community) were to 
determine all future causes relating to property and civil rights. The 
seigneurs understandably saw the Quebec Act as “a charter for the 
nation”, as “a kind o f perm anent guarantee of their ancient way of 
life”.51
T he constitutional obligation to protect the Francophone population 
as a cultural entity in the Canadas was reflected in more than just formal 
documents. Claude-Armand Sheppard in his study for the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism documented how, even 
in the initial military regime imposed by the British from 1760-1763, the 
process of government was carried on in both French and English.52 
During the period between the Treaty o f Paris (1763) and the Quebec 
Act (1774) he concluded, “both legislative and judicial practice soon 
established the two languages as equals at the very least. In fact, the 
English authorities themselves resorted to proclaiming their ordinances 
in French, a fact which even received subsequent judicial notice.”53 All 
proclamations and ordinances were published in French and English 
both before and after the Quebec Act. The debates and proceedings of 
the Legislative Council set up under the Quebec Act proceeded in 
French,54 although minutes were kept in English.55 In a judicial decision 
in 1813 the courts acknowledged that:
The French language has been used by His Majesty in his communications to 
His subjects in this province, as well as in His executive and in His legislative 
capacity, and been recognized as the legal means of communication o f His 
Canadian subjects.5* [Emphasis added]
“ Hilda Ncatby, French-Canadian Nationalism and the American Revolution in J. M. Rumsted (ed.), Canadian 
History Before Confederation (Georgetown, Ont.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1972) at 203.
“ Claude-Armand Sheppard, The Law of Languages in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 
10-14.
M!bid., at 36. Also see M. Wade, supra, footnote 48, at 20-21 and Bourinot, supra, footnote 39 at 13.
S4Bourinot, supra, footnote 39, at 13.
MM. Wade, supra, footnote 48, at 21.
**R. v. Talon, K.B., 1813 as reported in Maréchel Nantel, La langue française au palais, 5 R. du B. (1945), 
201-16 and cited in Sheppard, supra, footnote 52. at 37.
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The Legislative Assembly o f Lower Canada confirmed the primacy 
of the French language in Quebec by resolving 21 to 15 on December 
27th, 1792 that the official record o f proceedings in the Assembly — the 
Journals — should be printed in both languages.57 The Assembly 
further resolved 33 to 7:
That no motion shall be debated or put, unless the same be in writing and 
seconded, when a motion is seconded, it shall be read in English and in 
French by the Speaker, if he is master o f  the two languages, if not, the 
Speaker shall read in either o f  the two languages most familiar to him, and 
the reading in the other language shall be at the table by the clerk or his 
Deputy before debate.58
After 1791 statutes were enacted in both languages. And on January 
23rd, 1793 the Assembly, after heated debate for several days, formally 
made both languages equal as a source of law.59
Practice in the courts also confirmed that the Francophones should 
be able to express themselves and understand proceedings which 
affected their rights in their own language. An ordinance of 1777, which 
established a Court of Common Pleas, provided that writs o f summons 
be granted in the language of the defendant.60 Further ordinances were 
passed in 1785 and 1787 which established predominately Francophone 
juries for non-English speaking parties to both civil and criminal 
actions.61 In 1788 the Quebec Court o f Appeal established that 
pleadings be in both languages.62
The Constitutional Act, 1791 divided Quebec into Upper and 
Lower Canada. As noted above, Lower Canada clearly adopted the use 
of French and English in its legislative and judicial proceedings. In
"Journal o f the House o f Assembly, Lower Canada (1793) at 64 as cited in Sheppard, supra, footnote
52 at 45.
“ Rules and Regulations of the House of Assembly, Lower Canada (1793) at 142, 144 as cited in 
Sheppard, supra, footnote 52 at 45.
“ T he resolution as adopted reads as follows:
IV. That such Bills as are presented shall be put into both languages, that those in 
English be put into French, and those presented in French be put into English by the 
clerk of the House or his Assistants, according to the directions they may receive, before 
they be read the first time — and when so put shall also be read each time in both 
languages — well understood that each Member has a right to bring in any Bill in his 
own language, but that after the same shall be translated, the text shall be considered to 
be that o f the language of the law to which said Bill hath reference.
By Article 111, all Bills "relative to the Laws, customs, usages and civil rights o f this Province shall be 
introduced in the French language”. All Bills relative to the criminal laws of England and the Protestant 
clergy were to be introduced in the English language. Rules and Regulations of House of Assembly, Lower 
Canada, 1793 as reprinted in Kennedy, supra, footnote 40, at 232-233.
“ Art. 1, An Ordinance to Regulate the Proceedings m the Courts of Civil Judicature tn the Province of Quebec, 
February 25, 1777 as reprinted in Kennedy, supra, footnote 40, at 160. For a discussion of this 
ordinance see Sheppard, supra, footnote 52, at 38.
*'1785, 25 Geo. I ll,  c.2, Art. IX; 1787, 27 Geo. I l l ,  c.4. As cited in Sheppard, ibid., at 38.
“ Doutre and Lareau, Histoire générait du droit canadien. I, 742 as cited in Sheppard, ibid., at 39.
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contrast, Upper Canada quickly institutionalized English as the only 
official language of communication with political and judicial authorities, 
although there exists some evidence that the Legislative Assembly did 
show some respect for the French language.63
An important obstacle with any argum ent which tries to establish a 
constitutional obligation to protect language rights arises out of the Act 
of Union, 1840.64 Upon Lord Durham ’s recommendations the British 
reunited U pper and Lower Canada pursuant to the Act. Section XLI 
provided for the following:
And be it enacted that from and after the said reunion o f  the said two 
Provinces, all writs, proclamations, instruments for summoning and calling 
together the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly o f the Province o f  
Canada and for proroguing and dissolving the same, and all writs o f  
summons and election, and all writs and public instruments whatsoever 
relating to the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly or either o f  
them, and all returns to such writs and instruments, and all journals, entries, 
and written or printed proceedings o f what nature soever o f  the said 
Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly and each o f  them respectively, 
and all written or printed proceedings and reports o f  committees o f  the said 
Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly respectively, shall be in the 
English language only: Provided always, that this enactment shall not be 
construed to prevent translated copies o f any such documents being made, 
but no such copy shall be kept among the records o f  the Legislative Council 
or Legislative Assembly, or be deem ed in any case to have the force o f  an 
original record.
Lord Durham had recommended that “The French be assimilated into 
an Anglophone Canada: French Canadians were to be absorbed, 
amalgamated, absolutely united.”65 On the other hand, the Act of Union 
conspicuously stands out as an aberration to the consistently 
long-standing tradition o f respect for Francophone language rights and, 
more generally, respect for the Francophone culture as a whole. In the 
first place, the Act of Union did not on its own terms prevent the 
translation of documents or prohibit the use of French in debates. 
Furtherm ore, the Act o f Union did not touch language rights in the 
courts. Indeed, the newly created Legislature reaffirmed and expanded 
the use of French in pleadings, judicial proceedings, jury selection and 
admission to the Bar in enactments dated 1843,66 1 846,67 1 847,68 1 849,69
•*See generally Sheppard, ibid., at 51*53. Sheppard records that section 9 o f a 1794 Act required 
pleadings served on Canadian defendants to be written in the French language. On June 3rd, 1793 
Sheppard records that the Legislative Assembly resolved that all statutes be translated into French “for 
the benefit o f the inhabitants of the Western District of this Province and other French settlers. . . . ”
,43 8c 4 Victoria, c. 35, 1830 as reprinted in Houston, supra, footnote 31, at 149.
•‘See generally Sheppard's discussion o f the Report supra, footnote 52, at 53-55. Lord Durham ’s views 
are summarized in a letter he wrote to Lord Glenelg dated August 9th, 1838 as reprinted in Kennedy, 
supra, footnote 40, at 455.
••S.P.C. 1843, 7 Vic. c. 16, s.28 and S.P.C. 1843, 7 Vic., c. 19, s.l 1.
•’S.P.C., 9 Vic., c. 29, s.l.
••S.P.C., 10 & 11 Vic., c. 13, s.23.
••S.P.C. 1849, 12 Vic., c. 37, s.l and S.P.C. 1849, 12 Vic., c. 38, ss.19, 51.
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1855,70 1861,71 and 1864.72 Secondly, a series of statutes enacted by the 
newly created Assembly offset the effect of section 41 o f the Act o f Union by 
requiring the publication in French of all Canadian statutes and all 
Imperial statutes.73 Thirdly, the French language was given a preferred 
position in the proceedings o f the Legislature itself. The first Speaker, 
for example, was French-speaking.74 Standing O rder 29 reasserted the 
former practice that all documents before the Assembly had to be 
translated into French. Standing O rder 37 required that public bills be 
introduced in both languages. Further, Standing O rder 38 provided that 
all motions be read in both French and English. Finally, Standing O rder 
66 required that all notices o f intent to introduce a public bill be in both 
languages.75 Fourthly, on December 7th, 1843, a Royal Commission 
recommended that both French and English laws be made more 
accessible to the citizenry by re-publication of all past statutes and 
ordinances into the French language.76 Finally, in 1848, the United 
Kingdom Parliament repealed section 41 o f the Act of Union, 1840.77 
By a series of further enactments and practices, the official equality of 
French and English reappeared for the conduct of all proceedings 
related to the Legislature. 8
The consistent institutional support for the existence of a 
constitutional obligation with respect to the protection of the French 
language in the body politic was again reaffirmed by the enactment of 
section 133 o f the British North America Act, 1867. Section 133 
provided that:
Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in 
the Debates o f  the Houses o f  Parliament o f  Canada and o f  the Houses o f  the 
Legislature o f Quebec; and both those languages shall be used in the 
respective Records and Journals o f  those Houses; and either o f  those 
Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or 
issuing from any Court o f  Canada established under this Act, and in or from 
all or any o f  the Courts o f  Quebec. . . .
” 1855, 18 Vic., c. 104, s.l.
T,C.S.L.C. 1861, c. 77. s.28 and C.S.L.C. 1861, c. 83, s.94.
T*S.P.C. 1864, 27-8, Vic., c. 41, s. 129.
MAn Act to Provide for the Translation mto the French Language of the Laws of This Province and for other 
Purposes Connected Therewith (1841), 4 & 5 Viet., c. 11 reasoned in its preamble that it was "just and 
expedient” to translate all.laws “for the information and guidance o f a great portion o f H er Majesty's 
subjects in this Province. . . Also see An Act to Provide for the Distribution of the Printed Copies of the Laws 
(1844-45), 7 & 8 Viet., c. 68, s.3; and An Act Respecting the Consolidated Statutes for Upper Canada (1859), 
22 Vic., c. 30.
,4M. Cuvillier was the first Speaker.
T5See generally, Houston, supra, footnote 31, at 183.
’•‘‘Prefatory Notice” to The Revised Acts and Ordinances of Lower Canada (Montreal, 1845) at ix as quoted 
by Sheppard, supra, footnote 52, at 57.
” T he Union Act Amendment Act, 1848, 3 & 4 Viet. c. 35 as reprinted in Houston, supra, footnote 31, 
at 175.
T*See generally, Sheppard, supra, footnote 52, at 58-59.
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One should note that section 133 differs from the original Resolutions 
upon which it was based in that section 46 of the 1864 Quebec 
Resolutions79 and section 45 of the 1866 London Resolutions80 used the 
word “may” rather than “must”. The alteration of the verb, after a 
contentious, prolonged debate, indicated the compulsive nature with 
which political leaders considered the constitutional obligation toward 
language rights.81
The Articles of Capitulation, The Treaty of Paris, Imperial statutes, 
Royal Proclamations, Commissions to Governors, Royal Instructions to 
Governors, Canadian statutes, Governors’ ordinances, standing orders of 
legislatures, legislative practices, legislative resolutions, judicial decisions, 
judicial practices, Royal Commission reports, and legislative debate 
provide weighty and consistent evidence of the existence of a 
constitutional obligation on the part o f the State and a corresponding 
constitutional right on the part of Francophones (or, as they were called, 
the Canadians) with respect to the French language prior to 
Confederation. The State’s obligation was to ensure that Canadians (that 
is, Francophones) could read the laws, express themselves in political 
dialogue, communicate their grievances and defend themselves in their 
own language. The State was also obligated to protect the laws, customs 
and religion o f the Canadians. The Royal Proclamation o f 1763 and the 
Act o f Union of 1840 demonstrated a lack o f respect for these 
constitutional obligations. They can be explained, however, as isolated 
aberrations to an otherwise historically coherent undertaking by the 
State and the State’s officials to protect the French culture generally and 
the French language in particular. The Royal Proclamation was an 
aberration in that uncertainty prevailed in its afterm ath. Furthermore, 
colonial administrators did not comply with its terms in practice. In 
addition, it was preceded and followed by the overriding evidence of an 
obligation to respect the French language. Similarly, colonial legislators 
and administrators enacted statutes and ordinances which ran counter to 
the assimilationist intent of the Act of Union.
Political officials expressed a “sense o f obligation” toward the 
Francophone language in their declaratory and operational policy 
during a period of over one hundred years. Both Imperial 
administrators and the colony’s leaders appeared willing and capable of 
effectively translating that “sense of obligation” into concrete action. 
Political leaders deeply believed that they were bound by the 
constitutional obligation and that belief culminated in the British 
Parliament’s enactment o f section 133 o f the B.N.A. Act, 1867.
T*As reprin ted  in J . Pope, (ed.), Confederation: Being a Series o f Hitherto Unpublished 
Documents . .  . (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1895) at 48.
"Ibid., at 107.
*'See generally, P. B. Waite, (ed.), The Confederation Debates m the Province of Canada, 1865 (McClelland 
Stewart Ltd., Carleton Series, 1963).
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Section 133 did not create a new constitutional rule. Nor did the 
British Parliament posit “the law” by its enactment o f section 133. 
Rather, section 133 constitutes one of many important pieces of reliable 
evidence of the nature and extent o f the State’s constitutional obligations 
toward her citizens with respect to language. Section 133 does not 
declare “the law” today simply because it is found in the B.N.A. Act and 
because the latter was validly enacted according to the proper manner 
and form requirements. Rather, section 133 and the B.N.A. Acts as a 
whole constitute only one item of evidence of the Constitution. Section 
133 is significant evidence because of the “sense of obligation” which 
institutional history had consistently demonstrated toward the French 
religion, laws, customs and language over a hundred year period.
Having established a constitutional obligation to respect language 
rights in customary constitutional law in Canada until 1867, this analysis 
should proceed to the issue o f whether political leaders have fulfilled 
that constitutional obligation during the twentieth century82 and whether 
there ought to be such an obligation today. These issues are the subject 
of essays in themselves for they would necessitate a serious examination 
of statutory and judicial pronouncements between 1867 and 1979 as well 
as difficult philosophic questions about fundamental rights. One point, 
however, is clear. The prevailing constitutional ideology in English- 
speaking Canada has failed to appreciate the significance of customary 
constitutional law in this country and, as a consequence, the ideology has 
restricted our perspective to the precise wording of section 133 and to 
the heads of power in sections 91 and 92. Contemporary analyses of 
language rights in Canada have failed to realise that normative political 
values underlie the Canadian judiciary’s subservience to the legislature 
and that normative political values underlie the lawyer’s reliance upon 
the B.N.A. Act. As shown in Part A above, the very nature of a con­
stitutional obligation forces the lawyer to go beyond the traditional 
inquiry of the B.N.A. Act.
Claude-Armand Sheppard concluded, for example, that “a careful 
analysis of the terms of section 133 leads to the unavoidable conclusion 
that its scope is surprisingly limited. In effect, it deals only with some 
aspects of the legislative and judicial processes at the federal level and in 
Quebec.”83 Section 133, he wrote, failed to deal with subordinate 
legislation, with the many facets o f court procedure and with the actual 
conduct of government. Because of the principle o f legislative 
supremacy and because o f section 92(1) o f the B.N.A. Act which permits 
a province to amend its own constitution, so the argum ent goes, Quebec 
could restrict English language rights in Quebec. Indeed, Sheppard’s
"W ith  respect to this question see the study by my colleague, Professor Robert Kerr, entitled Language 
and the Law in Canada, to be published in Julio Menezes, ed , Decade of Adjustment: Legai Perspectives on
Contemporary Canadian Issues (Toronto: Macmillan & Co., 1979).
MSheppard, supra, footnote 52, at 99.
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argum ent seems to be convincing because Manitoba succeeded in doing 
just that with respect to the French language which had been similarly 
protected in the Manitoba Act.
Sheppard is not alone in his restrictive view of language rights in 
the Canadian Constitution. The Bilingualism and Biculturalism Report 
similarly concluded that:
. .  . even a superficial analysis o f the terms o f  section 133 makes it clear that its 
scope is very limited . . .  Constitutionally speaking, neither federal nor 
Quebec administrative law is required to be bilingual . .  . The section is not 
intended to secure fully the linguistic rights o f  the French-speaking or 
English-speaking minorities in Canada . . .  it cannot be expected to provide 
for the many complex situations that must now be faced.®4
Similarly, the Gendron Commission concluded that:
. . . there are no language stipulations elsewhere in the B.N.A. Act (than in 
section 133). On ordinary principles o f  English statutory construction, the 
language stipulations in s. 133 are exclusive and exhaust the fie ld ; and there is no 
room for any legal implication as to any other special protection o f  language 
interests in the B.N.A. Act.8* [Emphasis added]
Finally, the legal opinions submitted to the Gendron Commission by 
English-speaking Canada’s foremost constitutional lawyers searched in 
vain for the existence o f serious language rights within the confines of 
the B.N.A. Act.86 Albert Abel, for example, asserted that:
One o f  the well-established principles first laid down in Hodge v. The Queen, 9 
App. Cas. 117 (1883) that the legislatures o f  the Province have ‘authority as 
plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the 
Imperial Parliament in the plenitude o f  its power possessed and could 
bestow.’ I should have assumed that there were no limitations on what the 
'Assemblee National can enact other than such as one might trace to -the 
British North America Act.’87
Having confined the ambit of the Constitution to the four corners of 
the B.N.A. Act, the conclusions of these leading scholars are not 
surprising. Customary constitutional law and normative issues of political 
philosophy have had little place in their analyses.
,4Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report, Book I (Queen’s Printer, 1967) at 52-53.
“ Commission of Inquiry on the Position o f the French Language and on Language Rights in Québec, 
Report, Book II (Québec: Government of Quebec, 1972) at 22. See esp. 15-36.
•‘See generally, Commission of Inquiry, ibid.. Book II.
•’Commission o f Inquiry, ibid., Book II at 369.
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C. Constitutional Ideology as a source of political disunity in Canada
It was argued above that the existence and scope o f language rights 
in Canada depend upon the m anner in which we conceive the nature of 
the Constitution. The failure to appreciate the importance of normative 
assumptions as exemplified in customary constitutional law and the 
corresponding conception of the B.N.A. Act as pository rather than 
constitutive o f the law have contributed in no small degree to political 
disunity in Canada. I now wish to show why this has been so. I wish to 
explain how orthodox constitutional ideology has contributed to political 
disunity for at least two reasons.
(i) The transformation of political power in Canada
In the first place, orthodox constitutional ideology has deterred 
constitutional lawyers from appreciating the nature or the importance of 
the changes in the sources o f political power since 1867. As a 
consequence, constitutional lawyers have failed to address the 
implications which those political changes should have for language 
rights in particular and the Constitution more generally. Because the 
Constitution rests upon moral-political values rather than upon posited 
rules which apply in an “all-or-nothing” fashion, section 133 of the 
B.N.A. Act, 1867 does not declare the law with respect to language 
rights. Rather, it is merely evidence of the deeper moral-political value 
that Francophones outside of Quebec and Anglophones in Quebec possess 
the constitutional right to express themselves in their own language when 
communicating with the institutional sources of political authority in 
Canada and Quebec respectively. This constitutional right as reflected in 
section 133 must be seen as only a part of a bundle of constitutional 
rights originally intended to provide the Francophone community out­
side of Quebec and the Anglophone community in Quebec with the 
“peace o f mind” that their deep cultural values would be protected.
Why, then, was section 133 so narrowly drafted as to cover only the 
proceedings of federal courts and the proceedings of the Federal 
Parliament and Quebec Legislature? Because the courts and the 
Legislature constituted the major political institutions in 1867 wherein 
the citizen’s rights were burdened or enlarged. Professor Corry in an 
important study done for the Rowell-Sirois Commission in 1936 
documented how the sphere of government in 1867 was quite 
minimal.88 The Confederation Fathers expected that this minimal role of 
government would remain. The society of the Canadas of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries perceived freedom in what 
Isaiah Berlin has called “negative freedom ”. That is, freedom was
MJ. A. Corry, The Growth of Government Activities Since Confederation, a study for Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 19S6) at 1-6.
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conceived to be “freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from 
enslavement by others”.89 Although Canadian leaders did not accept the 
prescriptions of Adam Smith in a literal sense (the State’s financial 
backing of the canals and railways acknowledges that), they did believe 
that government should restrict its conduct to the general conditions of 
public order. Section 133 did not need to cover language rights in 
administrative law simply because there was 110 such thing as 
administrative law at that time. The public service consisted o f a few 
hundred hand-picked men, politically loyal and literally subservient to 
the Minister. The Minister’s source of power emanated from the 
legislative Assembly in a very real sense. The only other political 
institution which had the authority to determine rights was the Court.
This century, in contrast, has witnessed a transformation o f political 
assumptions and political power in Canada. Citizens have come to expect 
the State to contribute positively to the well-being of society. After the 
Depression, the citizenry came to conceive freedom in terms of the 
creation of socio-economic conditions whereby the citizen could fulfil his 
“true se lf’. This radical change in political values has been accompanied 
by changes in the sources of political power in this country. The courts 
and the legislature were no longer the chief institutions which 
determined the citizen’s rights and obligations. Rather, new sources of 
political power have arisen. The dimensions of power which the 
Legislature and the Courts formerly exercised over the individual have 
gradually shifted to large, complex governmental bureaucracies and 
to corporate decision-makers.
Statutes being drafted in very general terms during the past forty 
years, for example, have been replaced by statutory instruments, 
regulations and memoranda. The extent to which the courts may review 
these regulations is, generally speaking, limited. The Legislature likewise 
possesses very little, if any, influence in formulating the regulations or 
policy memoranda. Indeed, the latest Report of the Statutory 
Instruments Committee of the House o f Commons and the Senate 
shows how federal public servants have refused even to disclose the 
content of a great number o f statutory instruments under the excuse 
that they are not, in the opinion of the bureaucrats, statutory 
instruments at all.90 The regulations are enforced as well as “enacted” by 
a massive bureaucracy whose size and influence could not possibly have 
been foreseen prior to 1867. Furtherm ore, major policy initiatives have 
emanated initially from the Cabinet (after the 1880s) and eventually, 
especially after World War II, by the bureaucracy. Today political power
"Isaiah  Berlin distinguishes between negative and positive freedom. The former constitutes what we 
have traditionally considered as “ 'liberal', individual freedom". The latter comprises social and 
economic freedom. Mere economic or other incapacity does not mean that one lacks political freedom. 
Citizens lack political freedom only if they are intentionally prevented from attaining a goal. Berlin, Two 
Concepts of Liberty and Introduction in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) at lvi.
"C anada, Joint Committee of Senate and House o f Commons on Regulations and O ther Statutory 
Instruments, Second Report, 2nd sess., 30th Parliament, 1976-77.
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is not exercised so much when the Cabinet approves the various 
alternatives presented to it. Rather, political power prevails when the 
senior public servants determ ine the issues for the Ministers and submit 
what they deem to be the “realistic” alternatives facing a Minister.
Indeed, political scientists have documented how the initiation of 
legislative policy underlying statutes itself rarely proceeds from the 
Commons itself.91 Even in the case where a Minister himself initiates a 
legislative policy it is a bureaucrat — the legislative draftsman — who 
rounds out the policy and who decides the “practicality” of 
implementing it. Once the proposed bill reaches the floor of the House, 
party discipline within the majority party as well as the Standing Orders 
of the House militate against any substantial amendment to a bill either 
from Opposition Members or Backbenchers of the majority party. The 
dialectical debate within the Chamber possesses an air of unreality 
except in those relatively rare circumstances when a minority 
government exists.
The participants in the constitutional process from the Articles of 
Capitulation in 1760 to the B.N.A. Act in 1867 could not have foreseen 
the transformation of political institutions in Canada. Nor has it been 
possible for constitutional lawyers to take account of the transformation 
since their horizons have been restricted to the B.N.A. Act. But once 
one realises that the B.N.A. Act is constitutive rather than declaratory of 
constitutional law, section 133 brings on new meaning. It constitutes 
evidence of the moral-political value that the Francophone citizen out­
side of Quebec and the Anglophone citizen in Quebec possessed the 
constitutional right to express himself in his own language when 
communicating with the important institutions of political power. As new 
political institutions evolved, the constitutional obligations with respect to 
language rights could have been met only if lawyers had applied the 
principle of law underlying section 133 to the new sources o f political 
power, namely the government bureaucracy and the large corporations.
(ii) The federalist perspective
The second reason why orthodox constitutional ideology is 
connected with political disunity in Canada is that the federalist 
perspective itself leaves little room for the existence o f any fundamental
•'See generally T. A. Hockin, Apex of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1971); C. E. S. Frank, The 
Dilemma of the Standing Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, 4 Can. J. Pol. Sc. 1, (1971); T. 
d'Aquino, The Prime Minister’s Office: Catalyst or Cabalf Aspects of the Development of the Office in Canada and 
some Thoughts About Us Future, 17 Can. Pub. Adm. 55 (1974); D. Smith, Comments on ‘The Prime Minister's 
Office: Catalyst or CabaT? 17 Can. Pub. Adm. 80 (1974); House o f Commons (Canada), Special 
Committee on Statutory Instruments, Third Report, 1969; J . E. Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of 
Delegated Legislation (London, 1960), G. B. Doern, and Aucoin (eds.), The Structures of Policy-Making in 
Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971).
For studies done with respect to the British Parliament see generally R. H. S. Crossman, Introduction 
in Walter Bagehot's The English Constitution (London: Fontane, 1963); S. Walkland, The Legislative Process 
in Great Britain (1968); H. V. Wiseman (ed.), Parliament and the Executive (London: Routledge 8c Kegan 
Paul, 1966); R. M. Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition (Heinentann, 1973); J. P. Mackintosh, The British 
Cabinet (London: Methuen, 1968 2d ed.) esp. at 72-218 and 567-577.
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rights, let alone language rights in Canada. Constitutional lawyers have 
presumed, in their analysis o f the B.N.A. Act, that legislative power is 
complete in that there is no sphere of legislation dealing with political 
affairs which is not covered by the division o f legislative powers in the 
B.N.A. Act, 1867. What legislative authority the federal Parliament does 
not have, the provincial legislatures do, and vice versa. Because there is 
no conceivable limit to the scope o f the legislative intervention into the 
lives of the citizens contemplated by the division of powers perspective, 
it has been logically impossible for there to exist any fundamental rights, 
let alone language rights, in Canada.
The principle of the exhaustiveness of legislative power appears to 
have gone unquestioned by Canadian courts and legislators since it was 
initially laid down in the 1887 Privy Council decision of Dow v. Black92 
(1875). Authors of texts on Canadian constitutional law have accepted 
the courts’ premise in their traditional descriptively-oriented examina­
tion of the law. Clement's Canadian Constitutional Law93 declares, for 
example, that “the whole field of self-government in Canada is covered 
in the distribution of legislative power effected by the British North 
America Act. Whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs 
either to the Dominion or to the provinces within the limits of the Act. 
Whatever is not thereby given to the provincial legislatures rests with the 
parliament o f Canada.” A. H. F. Lefroy in his Canada’s Federal System 
asserted that:
There is, then, no possible kind o f legislation relating to the internal affairs 
o f Canada, which cannot be enacted either by the Dominion parliament or by 
the provincial legislatures. If the subject-matter o f  an Act is not within the 
jurisdiction o f  the provincial legislatures, acting either severally or in concert 
with each other, it is within the jurisdiction o f the Dominion parliament;
In his earlier Legislative Power in Canada95 Lefroy emphasized that the 
exclusive authority of the legislatures was “as plenary and ample within 
the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament, in the 
plenitude of its power, possessed and could bestow”. Its authority was 
“absolute”.96 The 1939 Senate Report on the B.N.A. Act reaffirmed this 
proposition.97 Finally, the most influential text on constitutional law in
*tDou> v. Black (1875), L.R. 6 P.C. 272; 44 L.J.P.C. 52. See also Valin v. Langlois (1879), 5 App. Cas. 115; 49 
L.J.P.C. 37; Russell v. Reg. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829; 51 L.J.P.C. 77; Lambe's Case (1887), 12 App. Cas 
575; 56 L.J.P.C. 87 and Brophys Case (1895), A.C. 202; 64 L.J.P.C. 70. Note, for example, the recent 
decision o f Dupond v. City of Montreal (1978), 19 N .R. 478 (S.C.C.).
•*(3rd ed.), 1916 at 453.
•‘Toronto: Carswell, 1913 at 96-97.
*‘Toronto:.Toronto Law Book & Publishing Co., 1897-1898 at 244.
••Lefroy, tbtd., at 270 fT.
•’Senate o f Canada, Report Relating to the Enactment of the British North America Act. 1867 (1939) at 14 fT.
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English-speaking Canada acknowledges that although sections 91 and 92 
are not entirely exhaustive, the qualifications to the exahustiveness 
principle merely flow from other “fundam ental” provisions of the 
B.N.A. Act (such as sections 133 or 91(1)) rather than from customary 
constitutional law.98
The consequence which the exhaustiveness doctrine poses for 
minority rights can be readily seen in the case of Union Colliery Co. v. 
Bryden."  At issue in that case was section 4 of the Coal Mines Regulation 
Act, 1890, which provided that “no boy under the age of twelve years, 
and no woman or girl of any age, and no Chinaman, shall be employed 
in or allowed to be for the purpose of employment in any mine to which 
the Act applies, below ground.” In approaching the problem the Court 
found that it need only ascertain whether the legislation was a matter in 
relation to s.92(10) (“Local Works and Undertakings”), s.92(13) 
(“Property and Civil Rights in the Province”), s.91(25) (“Naturalization 
and Aliens”) or the “deeming clause” at the end of s.91. In justifying this 
approach the Privy Council asserted that evidence as to the character of 
the legislation was “of no prevalency.” The Court continued:
But the question raised directly concerns the legislative authority o f  the 
legislature o f  British Columbia, which depends upon the construction o f ss.
91 and 92 o f  the British North America Act, 1867. These clauses distribute all 
subjects o f legislation between Parliament o f the Dominion and the several 
legislatures o f the provinces. In assigning legislative power to the one or the 
other o f  these parliaments, it is not made a statutory condition that the 
exercise o f such power shall be, in the opinion o f  a court o f  law, discreet. In 
so far as they possess legislative jurisdiction, the discretion committed to the 
parliaments, whether o f the Dominion or o f  the provinces, is unfettered. . . .”100 
[Emphasis added]
In Bryden, the C ourt’s analysis left no room for minority rights.
The doctrine of the exhaustiveness of legislative power has militated 
against the steadfast protection of language rights in Canada and 
Quebec for the following reasons. First, language rights have become 
“ad hoc” rights, rights which may exist one day in a given circumstance 
but not the next in a similar circumstance. They may be granted one day 
by one legislature but taken away the next by another.
Secondly, how could legislatures and courts possibly have fulfilled 
their constitutional obligations with respect to language rights when 
constitutional ideology contemplated that either the provincial legislature 
or Parliament could create rights, determine their meaning, ascertain 
their scope, and authorize their destruction? W hether a Francophone out­
' *'B. 1 .askin, Canadian Constitutional Law, revised 3rd edn. (Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at 92-93.
••Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580.
"»Ibid., at 584-585.
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side o f Quebec or an Anglophone in Quebec possessed a right to express 
himself and defend his rights in his indigenous language depended 
entirely upon the beliefs o f the legislative majority of Parliament or of 
the provincial legislature at any particular moment in history. By 
ignoring normative political assumptions as exemplified in customary 
constitutional law and by focusing upon sections 91 and 92, neither the 
courts nor the legislatures have acknowledged any theoretical limit to the 
extent to which a legislative majority could repress the minority in each 
respective jurisdiction. T he legislative majority in Parliament could 
enslave all Quebe^ois. Indeed, the legislative majority — or, more 
accurately, the mandarins, technocrats and other wielders o f power — 
could conceivably enslave all persons whose language is English.
Constitutional lawyers who have examined the nature of language 
rights in Canada have implicitly incorporated into their analysis the 
“tyranny of the majority,” which Mill so feared, as the basis o f our 
Constitution and, at times, as the basis of an ideal Constitution. I 
have argued that such an ideology propogates a “make-believe” world 
which inaccurately presumes that the real source of political power is the 
majority of the elected Members in the Legislature' or Parliament. 
Such an ideology also contemplates that there is no immunity from 
the legislative, judicial or administrative denial o f any right believed 
to be fundamental to the body politic. One can hardly claim, there­
fore, that there is a solid basis upon which any Canadian could have 
confidence in the implementation of his constitutional rights. Given 
the constitutional ideology of the “division of powers” there could 
hardly be expected to be any confidence in the future by any minority 
group which believed its rights to be essential for the preservation of its 
very entity. The ideology of our constitutional lawyers has by definition 
rejected the very possible existence o f fundamental rights, let alone 
language rights. Unless lawyers, jurists and legislators are prepared to 
conceive that there are some rights which are so fundam ental as to 
be immune from legislative, judicial or administrative denial, neither 
the individual nor a minority group can justifiably possess confidence in 
the future. Until that confidence can be justifiably established, political 
unity will remain upon sandy ground.
